Such exclusion has been held to be against the law in SIL Import USA. The statement of objects and reasons of the Amending Act 55 of 2002 confirms the legal position that the N. Act being a special statute, the Limitation Act is not applicable to it.Counsel further submitted that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the N. Counsel submitted that the judgment of this Court on the Arbitration Act is not applicable to this case because Section 43 of the Arbitration Act specifically makes the Limitation Act applicable to arbitrations. The basic provisions of law involved in this reference are proviso (c) to Section 138 and Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“the NI Act”). Facts of Saketh need to be stated to understand how the above question of law arose. We must also quote Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, on which reliance is placed in Saketh. either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the Cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.” [Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.] (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.” (1) In any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”. In Saketh cheques dated 15/3/1995 and 16/3/1995 issued by the accused therein bounced when presented for encashment. As per proviso (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act, the accused were required to make the payment of the said amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice i.e. According to the complainant for calculating one month’s period contemplated under Section 142(b), the date ‘15/10/1995’ has to be excluded. Orders of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice may be obtained for placing this matter before a larger Bench.” “Whether the complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act is within or beyond time as it was contended that it was not filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act? We will have to therefore re-examine it for the purpose of answering the reference. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid. The cause of action, therefore, arose on 15/10/1995.Cause of action would arise if the offence is committed.Thus, it was held that since the fax was received on 11/6/1996, the period of 15 days for making payment expired on 26/6/1996.The same principle is applicable in computing the period of 15 days under Section 138(c) of the N. Counsel submitted in (2000) 8 SCC 649 Section 12 of the Limitation Act is held to be in pari materia with Section 9 of the General Clauses Act. Thus, for the purposes of Section 142(b), which prescribes that the complaint is to be filed within 30 days of the date on which the cause of action arises, the starting date on which the cause of action arises should be included for computing the period of 30 days.Counsel submitted that in the same judgment this Court has held that use of words ‘from’ and ‘within’ does not reflect any contrary intention and the first day on which the cause of action arises has to be excluded. Counsel further submitted that Section 138(c) and Section 142(b) prescribe the period within which certain acts are required to be done.
The fallacy of the above reasoning is that it erases the starting date of the period of 15 days envisaged in clause (c). The rule is now well established that where a particular time is given, from a certain date, within which an act is to be done, the day of the date is to be excluded.”  1 All E. He issued his writ in this action claiming damages for personal injuries.
The accused gave some post-dated Cheques in repayment thereof.
Two of the said Cheques when presented on 3/5/1996 for encashment were dishonoured with the remark “no sufficient funds”.
This Court went on to observe that ordinarily in computing the time, the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last. According to counsel, seen in this light, the word ‘of’ occurring in Section 138(c) and Section 142(b) is to be interpreted differently as against the word ‘from’ occurring in Section 138(a).
Following the said rule in the facts before it, this Court excluded the date ‘15/10/1995’ on which the cause of action had arisen for counting the period of one month. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length. The word ‘from’ may be taken as implying exclusion of the date in question and may well be governed by the General Clauses Act, 1897.
has recently answered a reference whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose? While answering the reference, the Supreme Court held as under: “In our view, the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appellant in the case of Saketh India Ltd. According to the accused, however, the date on which the cause of action arose i.e. (1972) 1 SCC 639 wherein it was held that the rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded; the effect of defining the period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. and another(2003) 4 SCC 305, DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. Counsel pointed out that Section 138(a) provides a period of 6 months from the date on which the Cheque is drawn, as the period within which the Cheque is to be presented to the bank.